BridgePay Network Solutions

A ransomware attack disrupted BridgePay payment services beginning Feb. 6, 2026, affecting merchants and municipal billing. BridgePay said gateway instances were restored by Feb. 28, though partner connections took longer; Lightspeed reported one connection still unavailable March 4 and restored March 10.
The organization publicly identifies the event as cyber-related. The organization publicly documents the resulting service disruption.
Malware that encrypts systems or data, typically accompanied by a ransom demand.
Data was rendered inaccessible through unauthorized encryption, including ransomware-related encryption.
Authorized users could not access required data because of the incident, even when the data was not encrypted, deleted, or destroyed.
A primary service, system, platform, or operational capability became entirely unavailable.
A public, customer, employee, student, patient, vendor, or partner portal was unavailable or materially impaired.
The organization could not process, receive, issue, reconcile, or record payments normally.
The incident materially affected services delivered by or through a vendor, managed service provider, contractor, partner, or other third party.
The incident may involve extortion, but available evidence does not establish which extortion indicators were present.
BridgePay’s incident updates confirm a ransomware attack that disrupted its payment gateway and transaction processing beginning Feb. 6, 2026. The company did not name an attacker. The available record establishes a ransomware-related service outage but does not identify specific encrypted systems.
The outage interrupted gateway APIs and payment portals used by merchants and public agencies. Palm Bay, Florida, reported that its online utility-billing portal could not accept payments Feb. 9; credit-card payments resumed Feb. 11, while phone payments remained unavailable. Frisco, Texas, reported disruption to its municipal billing portal. Coppell, Texas, reported card and online payment disruptions across several city service areas; Clackamas County Water Environment Services in Oregon reported unavailable online and automated phone/text utility payments; and Wilson, North Carolina, reported disrupted MyWilson payments and autopay before restoration Feb. 26. Grand Traverse County, Michigan, reported that in-person credit card payments for many county services were unavailable. Reporting on merchants also described cash-only workarounds; the public record does not establish a complete count of affected businesses or public agencies. BridgePay said all TPI, TGateway and BridgePay gateway instances were restored by Feb. 28, though some processing-partner approvals remained pending. Lightspeed’s status record shows its BridgePay connection to Elavon remained unavailable March 4 and all of its third-party processor connections were restored March 10. Gateway restoration therefore did not mean every partner connection had recovered.
BridgePay is based in Maitland, Florida. Palm Bay and Frisco are documented downstream municipal impacts; their location links do not imply an outage across each city. The other named jurisdictions refer to specific affected payment services, not outages of all local government operations.
BridgePay’s own updates establish ransomware and the payment-processing outage with high confidence. The public record does not identify a ransomware group, confirm payment-card data exposure, or specify which systems were encrypted. The municipal and Lightspeed reports establish discrete downstream effects, not a complete count of affected customers.
BridgePay confirmed cyber involvement and service effects, supporting organization-confirmed cyber and disruption transparency.
Lightspeed marked all of its third-party processor connections restored March 10. BridgePay marked its incident resolved April 27. The latest dated evidence of an active downstream connection problem found in this review was March 4; a final restoration date for every BridgePay customer is not established.
The public record does not establish initial access, the attacker, a ransom demand or payment, full customer count, encrypted systems, or whether non-card data was accessed.
















BridgePay's documented Maitland base is a physical organization anchor; no Maitland facility-specific outage is established.
Geographic service overlay for the documented BridgePay-dependent payment disruption; no jurisdiction-wide outage is asserted.
Palm Bay's city utility-billing portal lost online payment capability as a downstream effect; this does not assert a citywide outage.
Geographic service overlay for the documented BridgePay-dependent payment disruption; no jurisdiction-wide outage is asserted.
Physical jurisdiction anchor for the affected organization's payment service; no facility-wide outage is asserted.
Geographic service overlay for the documented BridgePay-dependent payment disruption; no jurisdiction-wide outage is asserted.
Physical jurisdiction anchor for the affected organization's payment service; no facility-wide outage is asserted.
Physical jurisdiction anchor for the affected organization's payment service; no facility-wide outage is asserted.
Geographic service overlay for the documented BridgePay-dependent payment disruption; no jurisdiction-wide outage is asserted.
Geographic service overlay for the documented BridgePay-dependent payment disruption; no jurisdiction-wide outage is asserted.
Geographic service overlay for the documented BridgePay-dependent payment disruption; no jurisdiction-wide outage is asserted.
Physical jurisdiction anchor for the affected organization's payment service; no facility-wide outage is asserted.
Geographic service overlay for the documented BridgePay-dependent payment disruption; no jurisdiction-wide outage is asserted.
Physical jurisdiction anchor for the affected organization's payment service; no facility-wide outage is asserted.
Geographic service overlay for the documented BridgePay-dependent payment disruption; no jurisdiction-wide outage is asserted.
Physical jurisdiction anchor for the affected organization's payment service; no facility-wide outage is asserted.
Geographic service overlay for the documented BridgePay-dependent payment disruption; no jurisdiction-wide outage is asserted.
Physical jurisdiction anchor for the affected organization's payment service; no facility-wide outage is asserted.
Geographic service overlay for the documented BridgePay-dependent payment disruption; no jurisdiction-wide outage is asserted.
Physical jurisdiction anchor for the affected organization's payment service; no facility-wide outage is asserted.
Frisco's utility payment portal was unavailable as a downstream effect; the city said online payments resumed March 5, 2026. This does not assert a citywide outage.
Frisco's online utility billing portal was affected by the BridgePay outage. This area overlay does not assert that all city operations or residents were disrupted.
Geographic service overlay for the documented BridgePay-dependent payment disruption; no jurisdiction-wide outage is asserted.
Physical jurisdiction anchor for the affected organization's payment service; no facility-wide outage is asserted.
Physical jurisdiction anchor for the affected organization's payment service; no facility-wide outage is asserted.
Geographic service overlay for the documented BridgePay-dependent payment disruption; no jurisdiction-wide outage is asserted.
DysruptionHub reported BridgePay’s ransomware confirmation and broad payment gateway disruption, including municipal billing portals.
BridgePay confirmed ransomware, reported gateway instances restored by Feb. 28 while processor approvals were pending, and marked the incident resolved April 27.
WES said its online and automated phone/text utility payments were unavailable starting Feb. 6, 2026, because of the BridgePay cyber incident.
Frisco said its utility payment portal was unavailable because BridgePay experienced a nationwide service disruption.
Coppell said BridgePay’s disruption affected credit card and online payments for utility billing, the Public Works Annex, Police and Animal Services, and Rolling Oaks Memorial Cemetery.
Wichita said card payments through its water portal and water autopay were not processing because of BridgePay.
San Angelo said online water card payments were disrupted beginning Feb. 6 because of its third-party processor’s outage.
Palm Bay reported its online utility-billing payment portal unavailable Feb. 9 because of the BridgePay outage; credit-card payments resumed Feb. 11 while phone payments remained unavailable.
BridgePay confirmed ransomware caused the nationwide payment processing outage.
The county said BridgePay’s outage made in-person credit card transactions for many county services unavailable beginning Feb. 10, 2026.
Denton said online utility card payments, including Pay As You Go, could not be processed after BridgePay’s cyber incident.
BTU said its card payments were unavailable because of BridgePay’s ransomware incident and restored Feb. 12.
Marietta said it could not process certain online business license card payments because of BridgePay’s ransomware outage.
Kennewick Police said card payments for records requests and permit renewals were unavailable because of BridgePay.
Wilson said its BridgePay-dependent MyWilson portal could not process payments, autopay was delayed, and service was restored Feb. 26, 2026.
Bloomington said about 1,500 credit and debit card payments were disrupted by BridgePay.
Lightspeed said its BridgePay/Elavon connection remained unavailable March 4 and all third-party processor connections were restored March 10.
Signed-in members can report an error, update, or missing source.