DeKalb County

A September 2025 cyber incident disrupted DeKalb County, Indiana, computer and phone services, with administrative effects documented into October. A March 2026 notice said personal information may have been copied; ransomware and a full recovery date remain unconfirmed.
The incident is confirmed to be cyber-related, but the specific attack mechanism is unknown.
Authorized users could not access required data because of the incident, even when the data was not encrypted, deleted, or destroyed.
Telephone, voice-over-IP, call-center, or related voice communication services were unavailable or materially impaired.
Internal business, administrative, operational, or staff-facing systems were unavailable.
Users were unable to authenticate, sign in, access accounts, or use identity-dependent services.
Staff, customers, patients, students, residents, or other users could not access records or case information normally.
The organization could not create, update, search, file, approve, transmit, or otherwise process records normally.
The incident may involve extortion, but available evidence does not establish which extortion indicators were present.
DeKalb County, Indiana, experienced a confirmed cyber incident that prevented staff from signing into workstations and disrupted county computer and phone services in September 2025. The county’s Sept. 29 update establishes the cyber cause and operational effects; the initial access method remains unknown.
We reported Sept. 30, 2025, that recovery was continuing after discovery Sept. 25. A later county notice dated March 6, 2026, said information may have been copied between Aug. 21 and Sept. 25, 2025. That possible access window does not establish when the service disruption began.
The county brought in outside contractors and notified law enforcement while restoring computers and phones. Its Sept. 29 statement said emergency dispatch continued functioning, so the disruption should not be described as a 911 outage.
The Oct. 7 planning minutes in the November meeting packet show effects beyond employee logins: staff had limited access, an aerial map was unavailable because of access to geographic information systems, and a proposed plat could not be recorded until the cyber incident was resolved and a separate zoning variance was approved. These records establish an administrative interruption extending into October, without proving that every county service was unavailable.
Confidence is high that the cyber incident materially disrupted county operations because the affected government documented both. The March notice identifies potentially affected personal information but uses conditional language about copying; actual exfiltration, encryption, ransomware involvement and a responsible actor are not established.
The reviewed public evidence does not establish the entry point, number of affected workstations, full cost, ransom demand or payment. Name, official-domain and commissioner-name ransomware searches produced no matching lead. The social post embedded in our original report could not be independently retrieved during this review; the county’s accessible documents support the core findings.
The latest specific operational-impact observation located is Oct. 7, 2025. No authoritative restoration date was found through Oct. 23, 2026, so operations are presumed resolved based on elapsed time. The March 2026 data notice does not show continuing operational disruption or establish a recovery date.

Municipality anchor for affected county government offices in Auburn; does not designate City of Auburn government as a victim.
County government computer and phone interruption affected county administration. County boundary denotes governmental service jurisdiction, not a claim every resident or facility experienced an outage.
We reported disruption to county systems after the Sept. 25 discovery, with emergency dispatch continuing and recovery ongoing.
County staff could not access workstations, and computer and phone restoration continued. Emergency dispatch remained operational.
The county said information may have been copied during an August–September 2025 interval and offered credit monitoring.
October meeting minutes describe limited access, unavailable GIS mapping and a recording dependency on cyber incident resolution.
Signed-in members can report an error, update, or missing source.