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Governor Juan F. Luis Hospital and Medical Center cyberattack

Summary

Governor Juan F. Luis Hospital and Medical Center logo

An April 2025 cyberattack disrupted Governor Juan F. Luis Hospital and Medical Center’s network, clinical systems and billing. Patient care continued with paper workflows and federal telemedicine support. Important systems were still being restored in October; no exact final recovery date or confirmed personal-data theft is established.

Key facts

Timeline

  • Incident start:
    ? Earliest known or assessed start of malicious activity or incident activity.
  • First public signal:
    ? Earliest public indication of an outage, disruption, closure or other observable incident impact. The signal does not need to mention cybersecurity.
  • First public cyber evidence:
    ? Earliest credible public information connecting the incident or disruption to malicious cyber activity.
  • Official cyber disclosure:
    ? First official acknowledgment by the affected organization or an authoritative public body that the incident was cyber-related.
  • Last impact seen:
    ? Latest public indication that disruption, degraded operations, recovery work or unresolved impact was still ongoing.

Critical infrastructure sector

Incident characteristics

Assessments

Attack mechanisms

Data impacts

  • Data unavailable

    Authorized users could not access required data because of the incident, even when the data was not encrypted, deleted, or destroyed.

Operational impacts

  • Partial service outage

    A service, system, platform, or operational capability remained available only in part or with significant limitations.

  • Network outage

    Internal or external network connectivity was unavailable or materially impaired.

  • Internet access disruption

    The organization lost or materially restricted internet connectivity.

  • Internal systems unavailable

    Internal business, administrative, operational, or staff-facing systems were unavailable.

  • Application unavailable

    A specific application or software platform became unavailable or unusable.

  • Records access disruption

    Staff, customers, patients, students, residents, or other users could not access records or case information normally.

  • Records processing disruption

    The organization could not create, update, search, file, approve, transmit, or otherwise process records normally.

  • Healthcare operations disrupted

    Clinical, diagnostic, pharmacy, patient-care, medical-record, or other healthcare operations were materially affected.

  • Backlog created

    The disruption caused an accumulation of unprocessed requests, cases, orders, records, appointments, or other work.

  • Manual workaround required

    Staff or users had to rely on paper, telephone, in-person, offline, or other manual processes.

  • Alternate service channel required

    The organization redirected users to a different website, office, telephone number, email address, provider, or service channel.

  • Staff unable to work normally

    Employees or contractors were unable to perform normal duties because systems, data, facilities, or communications were unavailable.

Extortion indicators

  • Unknown extortion indicators

    The incident may involve extortion, but available evidence does not establish which extortion indicators were present.

Incident narrative

Analyst assessment

A cyberattack at Governor Juan F. Luis Hospital and Medical Center on St. Croix disrupted its network, clinical information systems and billing workflows in April 2025. Patient care continued through workarounds and outside support. The hospital’s April 27 notice said it had identified an incident affecting its networks that day. Later accounts by its spokesperson, federal responders and the chief executive date the incident to April 26. The record uses April 26 for onset while preserving that difference in the initial disclosure.

The direct hospital acknowledgment, federal response account and documented outages support a confirmed cyberattack assessment with high confidence. Recovery of important systems was still incomplete in October.

Operational significance

In an April 28 WTJX interview, hospital spokeswoman Aniah John said the internet and internal network were down and the hospital had activated its Incident Command Post. She said inpatient and outpatient care continued. That assurance describes continued delivery of care, rather than normal electronic operations.

ASPR’s July 2 response account documents an offline picture archiving and communication system and restricted access to clinical applications. Emergency imaging remained possible, but transmitting, viewing and reporting studies required alternatives. Federal telemedicine teams supplied secure connectivity, remote specialist access and support for more than 250 radiology studies, including backlogged cases.

At an October 15 town hall, CEO Darlene Baptiste described months of paper workflows and electronic billing delays. The Virgin Islands Consortium reported that 80%–85% of staff had regained Meditech access, while financial and business office systems were still returning. Baptiste corrected her description of $750,000–$800,000 a week as money lost: it was cash flow delayed by untimely electronic billing, not established permanent loss.

WTJX reported in May 2026 that Baptiste attributed continuing claims-processing, billing, collections and cash-flow constraints partly to the April 2025 attack. She described delayed remittance of payroll-related obligations amid broader financial strain. The hospitals’ total outstanding balances are not established cyberattack losses, and these financial consequences do not prove that the original systems outage continued into 2026.

Confidence and uncertainty

Governor Albert Bryan Jr. called the event ransomware during his April 28 briefing, as reported by the Consortium. The hospital spokesperson did not then confirm that characterization or disclose whether anyone demanded payment. Ransomware involvement is assessed with medium confidence; confirmed encryption, a specific malware family and an extortion demand are not established.

Baptiste later said attackers accessed one drive through an overlooked vulnerability involving two local servers and denied compromise of patient or staff personal information. Those are attributed findings, without a published forensic report, identified vulnerability or independent verification of the complete data scope. The evidence clearly establishes unavailable clinical information; it does not establish stolen personal data.

Analytic gaps

The reviewed record does not identify an attacker, ransom amount, payment outcome, full recovery cost or exact final restoration date. Name, domain and supported alias searches yielded no matching ransomware tracker claim. The separate Virgin Islands Lottery and Schneider Regional incidents are not merged into this event.

The operational status is presumed resolved because the documented disruption is historical and the research has not established a continuing outage. This is not a verified all-clear. October 15 is the latest directly dated recovery observation reviewed so far, and the initial statement that care continued does not negate the prolonged disruption of clinical and administrative workflows.

Organizations involved

Impacted location

Sources

JFL Hospital in U.S. Virgin Islands Impacted by Ransomware Attack

We reported the hospital’s initial network security incident and its assurance that inpatient and outpatient services continued.

JFL activates Incident Command Post after cyberattack wipes out network, internet

The hospital spokesperson said its internet and internal network were down, its Incident Command Post was activated and patient care continued. She did not confirm ransomware or discuss a demand.

Disaster Telemedicine Supports St. Croix Hospital During Data Security Incident

ASPR said the April 26 incident disrupted clinical systems and left the picture archiving and communication system offline. Federal telemedicine support helped process more than 250 radiology studies.

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