Town of Ulster

A September 2024 ransomware attack disrupted the Town of Ulster, New York, forcing manual municipal work and recovery from older backups. Officials documented payroll, water and sewer billing, fleet-fueling and records problems. Reconstruction and financial-reporting delays continued into spring 2025. The town later confirmed Sept. 10 unauthorized entry, Sept. 11 discovery and no personally identifiable information accessed or exfiltrated. Attribution and an exact full recovery date remain unresolved.
Malware that encrypts systems or data, typically accompanied by a ransom demand.
Authorized users could not access required data because of the incident, even when the data was not encrypted, deleted, or destroyed.
Internal or external network connectivity was unavailable or materially impaired.
Internal business, administrative, operational, or staff-facing systems were unavailable.
A specific application or software platform became unavailable or unusable.
A database or data-management system became unavailable or inaccessible.
The organization could not process, receive, issue, reconcile, or record payments normally.
Staff, customers, patients, students, residents, or other users could not access records or case information normally.
The organization could not create, update, search, file, approve, transmit, or otherwise process records normally.
Public administrative, licensing, permitting, court, tax, records, benefits, or other government services were materially affected.
Electric, water, wastewater, gas, telecommunications, or other utility operations were materially affected.
The disruption caused an accumulation of unprocessed requests, cases, orders, records, appointments, or other work.
Staff or users had to rely on paper, telephone, in-person, offline, or other manual processes.
The organization redirected users to a different website, office, telephone number, email address, provider, or service channel.
Employees or contractors were unable to perform normal duties because systems, data, facilities, or communications were unavailable.
An authoritative source stated that no ransom or extortion payment was made.
DysruptionHub assesses with high confidence that a ransomware attack disrupted the Town of Ulster’s municipal information systems in September 2024. The town’s 2024 financial statements place unauthorized entry on Sept. 10 and discovery on Sept. 11, when officials disconnected the network. The town confirmed ransomware deployment and later reported that its investigation found no access to or theft of personally identifiable information.
The attack impaired administrative systems and left employees rebuilding records from older backups and paper files. Contemporary reporting quoted Supervisor James Quigley describing a rapid shutdown, backup-server recovery and manual procedures. The separate police and court networks were not reported penetrated; the police chief subsequently described a brief records-management interruption during the response. Town email and the public website remained available.
Sept. 19 board minutes document paper building reviews, unavailable highway work-order databases and a disabled fleet-fueling system that required purchases at retail stations. Staff processed payroll and vendor payments through workarounds and reconstructed water and sewer billing for about 2,500 accounts. Restoring applications did not restore every recent record. Oct. 3 minutes show the fueling system functioning again while financial, billing and document recovery continued.
The effects persisted after the initial network recovery. January reporting described continued employee-record reconstruction, missing documents and water bills with incorrect account details. The Jan. 16 minutes also record a delayed financial-software upgrade. On Feb. 20, the building department was still processing five years of electronic records lost in the attack. These are administrative and utility-billing effects; the reviewed evidence does not establish interruption of drinking-water delivery or wastewater treatment.
Confidence is high in malicious cyber involvement, ransomware deployment and material operational disruption. Attribution remains unresolved. The town’s reported finding about personal information does not negate the loss of access to operational records. Its financial statements say communications with the attacker did not result in a ransom payment and that insurance covered recovery and restoration expenses apart from the deductible. The record does not establish an exact demand, payment instructions or a file-level encryption inventory.
The earliest verified public cyber acknowledgment in the reviewed material is Quigley’s Sept. 18 interview. Sept. 19 minutes refer to earlier Daily Freeman coverage, but its original chronology could not be verified. The sequence between the first outside characterization and the town’s first cyber-specific statement therefore remains unresolved. Private notifications to government agencies are distinct from public disclosure.
The documented operational status is presumed resolved, with no verified exact end date. On April 17, the supervisor still attributed delayed financial reporting to the attack. On May 1, the comptroller said year-end closeout and submission of audit materials were complete and expected monthly reporting to return to schedule. That progress does not establish when every missing record or billing problem was resolved.
The initial-access method, exploited vulnerability or credentials, malware family, attacker identity, complete damaged-data scope and final operational recovery date remain unknown. No matching native ransomware-claim lead was returned for the town’s name or domain. That negative search does not establish that no claim exists.

Ulster County contains the affected Town of Ulster municipal offices. The town’s general administrative systems required manual workarounds and record reconstruction.
The affected municipal offices include Town Hall in Lake Katrine and the highway, building, planning and assessor offices at 584 E. Chester St. Bypass. Both addresses are within the Town of Ulster. Department reports document administrative and record-processing disruption.
The affected town government’s administrative systems support services across the Town of Ulster, including municipal records, payroll and utility billing. The documented effects varied by department and recovery stage.
The Sept. 23, 2024, article describes the town’s administrative-server shutdown and reliance on backups and manual procedures after discovery of the attack. It reports effects on payroll, utility billing and other municipal work while separate police and court systems remained operational.
The Sept. 18, 2024, report quotes Supervisor James Quigley describing the town’s network shutdown, backup-server recovery and manual administrative procedures. Employees were prioritizing payroll and water billing while other records and municipal systems remained impaired.
The Jan. 23, 2025, syndicated Daily Freeman report describes continued employee-record reconstruction, missing documents and water bills with incorrect customer, meter or consumption details. Quigley said those bills were corrected as customers returned them. The account concerns billing and administrative data.
The town’s financial statements identify unauthorized entry Sept. 10, 2024, and discovery and network disconnection Sept. 11. They confirm ransomware deployment and report an investigation finding of no personal-information access or theft, no ransom payment, and insurance coverage of recovery expenses apart from the deductible.
The reissued 2023 financial statements, with an auditor’s report dated Nov. 19, 2024, describe the September 2024 cyberattack as a subsequent event. They report computer-record destruction and ongoing reconstruction. The observation concerns the 2024 attack despite the financial statements’ 2023 reporting period.
The April 17, 2025, minutes record that the supervisor’s financial report for August through December 2024 was still to be completed. The supervisor explicitly attributed the delay to the cyberattack.
The Feb. 20, 2025, minutes say the building department was processing five years of electronic records lost in the cyberattack. That department report documents continuing record-reconstruction work after initial system restoration.
The Jan. 16, 2025, minutes describe employee payroll-record reconstruction and a financial-software upgrade still on hold after the attack. The clerk reported that Laserfiche had moved to the cloud and new tax-collection software was in use.
The Oct. 3, 2024, minutes say the fleet-fueling system was functioning again while financial, billing and document reconstruction continued. Cloud payroll and accounting systems supported ongoing work, but some restored databases contained older records. The town described an insurance reserve for restoration.
The Sept. 19, 2024, minutes document paper building reviews, unavailable highway databases and fleet fueling, and payroll, vendor-payment and utility-billing workarounds. The town was restoring document and tax systems from older records. Officials distinguished the affected administrative network from the separate police and court networks.
The May 1, 2025, minutes say year-end closeout and submission of audit reports had been completed, with regular monthly reporting expected to resume. The comptroller also reported that one insurance reimbursement remained outstanding.
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