Hudson School District

A June 12, 2024, cyber incident disrupted Hudson School District’s networks, phones and educational records and permanently lost some financial data. Recovery continued in August. Auditors later linked data loss to accounting delays alongside staffing problems; the exact full-restoration date remains unverified.
Unauthorized access to systems, accounts, networks, or data.
Data was intentionally deleted, wiped, destroyed, or made permanently unrecoverable.
Authorized users could not access required data because of the incident, even when the data was not encrypted, deleted, or destroyed.
A service, system, platform, or operational capability remained available only in part or with significant limitations.
Internal or external network connectivity was unavailable or materially impaired.
Telephone, voice-over-IP, call-center, or related voice communication services were unavailable or materially impaired.
Internal business, administrative, operational, or staff-facing systems were unavailable.
A database or data-management system became unavailable or inaccessible.
Staff, customers, patients, students, residents, or other users could not access records or case information normally.
The organization could not create, update, search, file, approve, transmit, or otherwise process records normally.
Instruction, student services, school administration, learning platforms, transportation, or other educational operations were materially affected.
Services continued but with longer processing, response, delivery, or completion times.
The disruption caused an accumulation of unprocessed requests, cases, orders, records, appointments, or other work.
Employees or contractors were unable to perform normal duties because systems, data, facilities, or communications were unavailable.
Available evidence indicates that no extortion demand, threat, communication, or related pressure tactic was identified.
Hudson School District in New Hampshire experienced unauthorized access to its internal information systems on June 12, 2024. Note 16 of its 2024 annual report describes temporary loss of access to critical databases and permanent loss of some financial data. Staff reconstructed information using backups and other records.
This is a confirmed cyber incident with operational and data-availability effects. The financial report establishes more than a precautionary shutdown, while leaving the initial-access method and attacker unidentified. Permanent data loss does not itself establish intentional destruction or encryption.
We reported on June 25, drawing on contemporaneous Union Leader reporting, that network and phone disruptions delayed final grades and report cards. The district’s financial report independently confirms database and financial-record problems affecting administrative work.
At the Aug. 5 school board meeting, the superintendent said recovery was continuing. The business administrator described working through affected data while closing the fiscal year and preparing for an audit. These findings do not establish that instruction stopped, schools closed or every system remained unavailable through August.
The annual report’s audit findings said cybersecurity-related data loss compounded accounting delays alongside staffing turnover and inadequate reconciliations. Cash accounts were unreconciled when audit fieldwork began in November 2024; reconciliation was completed in December, delaying the audit. The district agreed to corrective procedures.
At the Feb. 7, 2026, district meeting, school board Chair Maureen Dionne said the incident had prevented staff from retrieving encumbrances and invoices at the end of fiscal 2024. She said auditors recommended carrying that year’s fund balance into fiscal 2025, contributing to an unusually high balance alongside higher-than-forecast revenue.
An Aug. 7 elementary-school notice directed families to the parent portal for annual forms and anticipated later teacher assignments. It demonstrates expected routine portal use, rather than an incident-wide all-clear. The historical incident is presumed resolved; its exact full-restoration date remains unknown.
Confidence is high in the unauthorized-access and financial-data findings because the district’s annual report explicitly documents them. June 12 is the incident date identified retrospectively, while June 25 is the first verified public reporting. The annual report also describes outside assistance, additional authentication, monitoring and staff training.
The Aug. 5 minutes record the superintendent’s statement that student and staff personal identification information had not been breached. In a February 2025 WMUR retrospective, Superintendent Dan Moulis described an attack involving the firewall and servers and repeated that finding. The personal-information statements do not negate the separately documented loss of financial records.
The evidence does not establish a ransomware operator, ransom demand, payment, data theft or public leak. It also does not resolve which specific systems remained impaired during the August recovery work. The later annual report is not evidence of a new 2025 attack or uninterrupted downtime until publication. Nashua’s ransomware incident and later PowerSchool notices are separate events.

Hillsborough County contains the affected school district’s Hudson offices. This site-level county anchor represents the organization’s physical presence. It does not establish county-government compromise, countywide educational disruption or the location of affected servers.
Hudson contains the affected district’s central offices at 20 Library St. This physical anchor is separate from the town-equivalent school service overlay. It does not locate the intruder, compromised server or a specifically closed building.
Hudson town represents the affected school district’s geographic service area. This educational remit does not imply a town-government intrusion, an outage at every household or closure of every school. Regional career-center enrollment does not enlarge the district boundary.
We reported, citing the Union Leader, that disrupted district networks and phones delayed final grades and report cards.
The headline identifies a cyber incident that disrupted Hudson School District’s network and phone systems. The standfirst describes professional responders working on recovery.
The school directed families to use the parent portal for annual forms and said teacher assignments would be posted Aug. 15.
Superintendent Dan Moulis described Hudson’s firewall and server effects and said student and staff information had not been breached.
The federal county-subdivision dataset identifies Hudson town in Hillsborough County by GEOID 3301137940.
The federal school-district dataset identifies Hudson School District by GEOID 3303930.
The federal county dataset identifies Hillsborough County, New Hampshire, by GEOID 33011.
The district lists its schools, early-learning buildings and Alvirne career and technical education center, with central offices at 20 Library St.
The school board’s index provides public meeting records and district contact information.
The district’s Child Find notice identifies SAU 81 as serving Hudson and describes its responsibilities within the town’s geographic boundaries.
The town describes Hudson’s southern New Hampshire location along the Massachusetts border, adjacency to Nashua, suburban landscape and Benson Park.
Note 16 confirms June 12, 2024, unauthorized access, temporary database unavailability and permanent financial-data loss. Audit findings say data loss compounded accounting delays alongside staffing turnover and inadequate reconciliations. Cash reconciliation was completed in December 2024 after being outstanding at November fieldwork.
School board Chair Maureen Dionne said the cyber incident prevented retrieval of year-end fiscal 2024 encumbrances and invoices. She said auditors recommended carrying the fund balance into fiscal 2025, contributing to an unusually high balance alongside higher revenue.
The draft minutes describe continuing cyber-incident recovery and business-office data work for fiscal-year close and audit. The superintendent said student and staff personal identification information had not been breached.
Signed-in members can report an error, update, or missing source.