Richland School District

Unauthorized access led Richland School District in Washington to disconnect systems June 11, 2024, disrupting phones, internet and academic records. Transcript processing remained affected in July. Technology access was restored by Aug. 13; the exact restoration date is unknown.
Unauthorized access to systems, accounts, networks, or data.
Authorized users could not access required data because of the incident, even when the data was not encrypted, deleted, or destroyed.
Internal or external network connectivity was unavailable or materially impaired.
The organization lost or materially restricted internet connectivity.
Telephone, voice-over-IP, call-center, or related voice communication services were unavailable or materially impaired.
A public, customer, employee, student, patient, vendor, or partner portal was unavailable or materially impaired.
Internal business, administrative, operational, or staff-facing systems were unavailable.
A specific application or software platform became unavailable or unusable.
Staff, customers, patients, students, residents, or other users could not access records or case information normally.
The organization could not create, update, search, file, approve, transmit, or otherwise process records normally.
Instruction, student services, school administration, learning platforms, transportation, or other educational operations were materially affected.
Services continued but with longer processing, response, delivery, or completion times.
The disruption caused an accumulation of unprocessed requests, cases, orders, records, appointments, or other work.
The organization redirected users to a different website, office, telephone number, email address, provider, or service channel.
Employees or contractors were unable to perform normal duties because systems, data, facilities, or communications were unavailable.
Customers, residents, patients, students, vendors, or members of the public faced access restrictions or could not use services normally.
Available evidence indicates that no extortion demand, threat, communication, or related pressure tactic was identified.
Unauthorized access to Richland School District’s network led the Washington district to disconnect systems June 11, 2024. Telephone, internet and academic-record services were disrupted near the end of the school year, with recovery work continuing into July. Cyber involvement and the administrative effects are confirmed. The specific intrusion method, ransomware involvement and attacker remain unresolved.
At the Aug. 13 board meeting, Superintendent Shelley Redinger said access to technology had been restored. This supports treating the incident as resolved, without establishing the precise day every affected function returned.
The district’s June 12 message to families, quoted in contemporaneous Tri-City Herald reporting, acknowledged unauthorized access and precautionary system disconnections. Attendance records, grades and enrollment services were unavailable. Records requests, applications and other submissions were being held for later processing. June 12 was also the final day of classes.
A June 22 follow-up reported that the network would remain down during a staged summer recovery. Some staff functions, including access to Google Drive and OneDrive, were expected to take weeks to restore. Those estimates were forecasts.
By July 8, the district’s PowerSchool grading and transcript platform was still offline. Graduates were waiting for official records needed by colleges and other postsecondary programs. Local television reporting described explanatory letters to institutions and access to final secondary-school grades through Canvas. The goal of completing transcripts by the end of July was not a restoration announcement.
The July 9 board minutes record recovery moving more slowly than hoped, payroll being accommodated and assistance for seniors needing transcripts for college, technical training or military service. These are concrete continuing administrative effects. They do not establish that payroll failed or that every school function remained unavailable throughout the summer.
Confidence is high in the cyber and operational findings because the district’s own board records and named communications corroborate them. June 11 describes detection and containment; the June 12 family message is the earliest verified official acknowledgment of unauthorized access. The evidence does not establish when the initial intrusion began.
The district’s June update said forensic specialists found no evidence that student or staff data was affected. In July, Redinger also assured families that their data was safe. These are attributed findings. The inability to access grades and records establishes an availability problem; it does not independently establish copying, encryption or permanent loss.
The August minutes also describe returning to the previous practice of livestreaming board meetings and allowing remote public comment. This supports recovery of routine communications, rather than an exact technical completion time.
The public evidence does not identify an attacker, ransom demand, payment or confirmed data release. It does not specify the initial-access technique or establish that encryption caused the shutdown. The district used third-party forensic specialists, but the public statements do not provide a detailed technical report.
The exact restoration date remains unknown. The Aug. 13 statement establishes that access had returned by then, while the July 9 record documents continuing recovery. Use of PowerSchool as an affected local application does not establish compromise of the vendor’s own systems or connect this event to the separate later PowerSchool breach.

Benton County contains the affected district’s West Richland administration center and Richland school sites. This physical county anchor accompanies the municipal anchors and the distinct school-district service area.
The affected public district’s school-district territory supplies its service-area overlay, paired with the organization’s service-area relationship. Districtwide digital administration was disrupted; the area does not establish a uniform outage at every campus.
Richland contains documented district campuses, including Richland High School at 930 Long Avenue. The municipality is a physical district anchor for the affected academic-records and administrative services.
West Richland contains the affected district’s administration center at 6972 Keene Road. This physical office anchor accompanies the separate school-district service-area overlay.
The report describes unauthorized access and protective disconnections disrupting Richland School District’s phones, internet, grades, attendance and enrollment. It draws on GovTech’s republication of the local reporting.
Richland School District told families it had identified unauthorized network access and disconnected additional systems while specialists investigated. Phone and internet outages disrupted access to grades, attendance and enrollment, with academic records and end-of-year processing affected.
GovTech republished the Tri-City Herald’s account of Richland’s unauthorized-access investigation and protective disconnections. The report described phone, internet, grade and enrollment interruptions. This is a republication of the local report, rather than independent corroboration.
The district’s network and academic-record functions remained unavailable after the June 11 containment. A June 21 family letter said investigators had found no evidence that student or staff data had been affected. Proposed summer recovery dates remained estimates.
Richland’s PowerSchool grading and transcript application had been offline since June 11, leaving graduates waiting for records needed by colleges and other institutions. The report concerned the district’s application access and did not establish compromise of the vendor’s own network.
Graduates could not obtain normal transcripts while the district’s grading system remained unavailable. The superintendent described explanatory letters for postsecondary institutions and Canvas as a way for secondary students to view grades. The proposed end-of-July transcript target was a forecast.
At the July 9 board meeting, district officials said technology recovery was proceeding more slowly than hoped. They described maintaining payroll and assisting graduating seniors who needed transcripts, documenting continued recovery work and practical measures to reduce its effects.
At the Aug. 13 board meeting, the superintendent reported that access to technology had been restored after the summer cyber event. The board also discussed resuming routine meeting technology practices. The minutes establish recovery by that meeting, rather than an exact restoration date.
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