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SafePay

Ransomware Group8 claimsLast activity:

Overview

SafePay is a financially motivated ransomware group first observed in late 2024. Microsoft Security Intelligence describes an operation that conducts intrusions and negotiations internally rather than openly distributing its malware through a conventional affiliate program. Public victim claims continued into 2026, including a claim involving the Harrison County Commission in West Virginia.

SafePay’s malware checks for Russian and Ukrainian language settings, but that behavior does not establish where its operators are located or who directs them. No reviewed authoritative source publicly identifies the members or connects the group to a government.

Activity and targeting

Microsoft reported a concentration of activity involving organizations in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada, with victims across manufacturing, construction, health care, retail and professional services. It also identified managed service providers as especially consequential targets because one compromise may expose downstream customers. These patterns describe reported cases and should not be treated as an exclusive victim profile.

Check Point Research ranked SafePay as the most prevalent ransomware group in its May 2025 dataset and said the operation had listed more than 200 organizations by June 2025. Leak-site totals are actor claims rather than a count of independently verified intrusions.

Methods and operational characteristics

SafePay combines data theft, file encryption and threats to publish stolen information. Microsoft reported that the group may call victims directly and operates a leak site for publication pressure. Its analyzed encryptor appends the .safepay extension, supports partial encryption to accelerate impact and shows substantial similarities to LockBit while also containing deliberate modifications. Code resemblance does not by itself prove shared operators.

An NCC Group incident-response investigation documented initial access through a misconfigured FortiGate virtual private network policy and weak credentials, followed by domain administrator access, ScreenConnect persistence, a QDoor backdoor, credential-access activity, Remote Desktop Protocol and server-message-block movement, and batch-driven ransomware deployment. Those findings describe one investigated intrusion, not a fixed playbook for every SafePay case.

What type of group is it?

SafePay is best classified as a centralized ransomware group conducting financially motivated double extortion. Microsoft and Check Point reporting distinguish it from an openly recruited ransomware-as-a-service program, although the absence of a public affiliate program does not reveal the operation’s internal staffing or partnerships. The reviewed evidence does not support a confirmed alias, predecessor, geographic attribution or state relationship.

Incident claims

Harrison County, West Virginia, ransomware attack

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Incident date: Source: otherPublished: Discovered:

Claim details

SafePay claimed responsibility for the April 2026 Harrison County Commission incident and reportedly imposed a three-day deadline for payment over data it said it stole. The county did not acknowledge the claim, and Comparitech said it could not independently verify attribution or theft.

Middletown, Ohio cyberattack disrupted city services

Incident date: Source: ransomware.liveDiscovered:

Claim details

SafePay listed the City of Middletown, Ohio, under cityofmiddletown.org. Later reporting describes a Sept. 12, 2025 claim; the original post time is unknown. The city confirms unauthorized data removal but has not verified SafePay’s responsibility. Encryption, a ransom amount and payment remain unestablished. The separate 2024 INC claim concerning Middletown Township describes a different entity.

Ridgefield schools' ransomware response disrupts network access

Incident date: Source: ransomware.live and ComparitechDiscovered:

Claim details

SafePay named Ridgefield Public Schools and ridgefield.org in a listing discovered by ransomware.live Aug. 5, 2025. Comparitech reported a threat to release 90 GB of allegedly stolen data and a short payment deadline.

SafePay’s responsibility, the claimed volume, actual publication and payment outcome remain unverified. The district’s acknowledgment of ransomware does not independently identify the group.

Liberty Township ransomware incident

Incident date: Source: ransomware.liveDiscovered:

Claim details

SafePay named Liberty Township, Ohio, and its liberty-township.com domain in a victim listing, alleging theft of 48 GB. DataBreaches and Comparitech reported the claim; DataBreaches described examining purportedly leaked credentials.

The administrator confirmed ransomware and recovery of the network, but the township has not confirmed SafePay’s responsibility or the claimed volume. June 14, 2025, marks tracker discovery, rather than the attack date or verified original publication time.

Conduent cyberattack disrupts child-support payments

Incident date: Source: ransomware.liveDiscovered:

Claim details

SafePay named Conduent and its conduent.com domain in a listing discovered by ransomware.live Feb. 20, 2025. The entry supplies no attack date or original publication time.

Conduent confirmed unauthorized access and theft of client files, but its disclosures do not confirm SafePay’s responsibility, file encryption, a ransom demand or payment. Discovery of the listing does not establish when the October 2024 intrusion or January 2025 service disruption began.

Starkville-Oktibbeha Consolidated School District ransomware incident

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Incident date: Source: ransomware.liveDiscovered:

Claim details

SafePay named Starkville-Oktibbeha School District and starkvillesd.com in a listing discovered by ransomware.live Dec. 29, 2024, UTC. Breachsense records discovery Dec. 30. A Ransomfeed alert on Reddit appeared Dec. 29 Eastern time, or Dec. 30 UTC, before the district’s Jan. 6 acknowledgment. Those observations do not establish the original actor-post or intrusion date.

The district acknowledged malicious encryption but has not publicly confirmed SafePay’s responsibility. Data removal, leak volume and the original post’s publication date remain unverified.

Harrison County Schools network disruption

Incident date: Source: other

Claim details

SafePay named Harrison County Schools’ harcoboe.net domain, according to Breachsense and RansomLook. Breachsense reports an alleged 26 GB collection. The group’s responsibility, encryption and the volume and contents of any stolen data have not been independently confirmed.

The district said some current and former employee information was likely involved, while its student-data findings remained unresolved. Tracker dates differ: RansomLook displays Feb. 16, 2025, Breachsense records discovery Feb. 17 and another tracker gives Feb. 7. The original post’s publication date remains unknown. The listing concerns the January 2025 school-system incident.

Sources