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Los Angeles court ransomware attack closes courthouses

Summary

Los Angeles County Superior Court logo

A July 19, 2024, ransomware attack disrupted Los Angeles County Superior Court systems and closed all 36 courthouses July 22. Services returned in stages, with full functionality restored July 29. Hosted phone service at five other county courts was also affected.

Key facts

Timeline

  • Incident start:
    ? Earliest known or assessed start of malicious activity or incident activity.
  • First public signal:
    ? Earliest public indication of an outage, disruption, closure or other observable incident impact. The signal does not need to mention cybersecurity.
  • First public cyber evidence:
    ? Earliest credible public information connecting the incident or disruption to malicious cyber activity.
  • Official cyber disclosure:
    ? First official acknowledgment by the affected organization or an authoritative public body that the incident was cyber-related.
  • Last impact seen:
    ? Latest public indication that disruption, degraded operations, recovery work or unresolved impact was still ongoing.
  • Incident end:
    ? Confirmed or defensibly assessed end of material operational disruption or incident activity.

Primary victim organization

Organization types

Critical infrastructure sector

Incident characteristics

Assessments

Attack mechanisms

  • Ransomware

    Malware that encrypts systems or data, typically accompanied by a ransom demand.

  • Unauthorized access

    Unauthorized access to systems, accounts, networks, or data.

Data impacts

  • Data unavailable

    Authorized users could not access required data because of the incident, even when the data was not encrypted, deleted, or destroyed.

Operational impacts

  • Partial service outage

    A service, system, platform, or operational capability remained available only in part or with significant limitations.

  • Network outage

    Internal or external network connectivity was unavailable or materially impaired.

  • Phone service disruption

    Telephone, voice-over-IP, call-center, or related voice communication services were unavailable or materially impaired.

  • Website unavailable

    A public-facing website was unavailable, disabled, or inaccessible.

  • Online portal unavailable

    A public, customer, employee, student, patient, vendor, or partner portal was unavailable or materially impaired.

  • Internal systems unavailable

    Internal business, administrative, operational, or staff-facing systems were unavailable.

  • Application unavailable

    A specific application or software platform became unavailable or unusable.

  • Database unavailable

    A database or data-management system became unavailable or inaccessible.

  • Records access disruption

    Staff, customers, patients, students, residents, or other users could not access records or case information normally.

  • Records processing disruption

    The organization could not create, update, search, file, approve, transmit, or otherwise process records normally.

  • Government services disrupted

    Public administrative, licensing, permitting, court, tax, records, benefits, or other government services were materially affected.

  • Facility closure

    One or more offices, schools, clinics, stores, plants, branches, or other facilities closed because of the incident.

  • Service delay

    Services continued but with longer processing, response, delivery, or completion times.

  • Manual workaround required

    Staff or users had to rely on paper, telephone, in-person, offline, or other manual processes.

  • Alternate service channel required

    The organization redirected users to a different website, office, telephone number, email address, provider, or service channel.

  • Staff unable to work normally

    Employees or contractors were unable to perform normal duties because systems, data, facilities, or communications were unavailable.

  • Customer or public access restricted

    Customers, residents, patients, students, vendors, or members of the public faced access restrictions or could not use services normally.

  • Downstream organization impact

    The incident caused operational effects at customers, affiliates, subsidiaries, partners, tenants, or other dependent organizations.

Extortion indicators

  • Unknown extortion indicators

    The incident may involve extortion, but available evidence does not establish which extortion indicators were present.

Incident narrative

Analyst assessment

A ransomware attack disrupted the Los Angeles County Superior Court beginning July 19, 2024. The court’s initial statement confirmed the attack and said staff disabled network systems to contain it. Officials believed the incident was unrelated to the faulty CrowdStrike update occurring that day. The reviewed evidence establishes ransomware and operational disruption, but does not identify the operator or initial access method.

Operational significance

The court’s July 19 revised notice documented unavailable call centers, impaired electronic filing and postponed proceedings. Urgent filers were directed to clerk’s offices in person; other filings were deferred. This revised notice superseded an earlier assertion that electronic filing remained available.

A July 21 release and closure order described inaccessible court-data platforms, telephone systems and internal case-management systems. All 36 courthouses closed July 22. Filing deadlines and specified proceedings received one-day extensions. This was a countywide court-system interruption; it does not establish compromise of Los Angeles County government’s separate computer systems.

The court reopened July 23 with limited functionality. Its July 24 update reported restored jury-registration and telephone reporting instructions, plus remote access for civil, juvenile, criminal and appellate matters. Remote appearances in family law, probate and traffic cases remained unavailable. Affected parties were directed to appear in person where possible, with continuances for matters that could not proceed.

In its July 25 service-status update, the court showed its attorney portal still unavailable while all 36 courthouses and clerk’s offices were open, jury reporting was operating and court proceedings were moving forward.

The disruption reached other courts through Los Angeles-hosted telephone infrastructure. Associated Press reporting published by SecurityWeek identified Shasta, Inyo, San Luis Obispo, Stanislaus and Colusa counties. Shasta’s court executive described unavailable phones, fax and text reminders on July 24 while cases continued normally. A Stanislaus court notice independently confirmed its telephone outage and directed users to email and online services. These are downstream service effects, not proof that each court’s own network was separately compromised.

Recovery and confidence

On July 29, the court announced that all public-facing and internal network systems had been restored that morning, including document access, remote appearances, jury registration, traffic payments and electronic filing. That statement establishes July 29 as the restoration date for the primary court’s systems. The reviewed sources do not establish a separate exact restoration time for every dependent court’s telephone service.

Analytic gaps

The July 19 preliminary investigation found no evidence of compromised court-user data. The July 29 notice still described investigation of possible data compromise as ongoing. Neither statement establishes a final finding that no information was accessed or stolen. The reviewed evidence does not substantiate a specific encryption mechanism, data theft, a ransom demand or payment, or an identified responsible group.

July 19 is supported as the reported attack and disruption start, first public service warning and public ransomware disclosure. July 25 is the latest directly reviewed dated observation of ongoing operational impairment; July 29 is the confirmed restoration date. No precise time of initial intrusion is established. Later unrelated court outages do not extend this incident.

Organizations involved

Impacted locations

  • Los Angeles County, California

    Los Angeles County contains the Stanley Mosk Courthouse at 111 N. Hill St. All 36 court locations across the county closed July 22; they are not all in the city of Los Angeles.

    The court serves Los Angeles County. All 36 courthouses closed July 22 during ransomware recovery. The county government’s separate computer systems were reported unaffected.

  • Los Angeles, California

    Los Angeles contains the Stanley Mosk Courthouse at 111 N. Hill St. It was among the 36 countywide court locations closed July 22.

  • Redding, California

    Redding contains Shasta Superior Court’s main courthouse. The court lost hosted telephone, fax and text-reminder service while cases continued normally; a separate intrusion into its network is not established.

  • Shasta County, California

    Shasta County contains the affected customer court’s main courthouse in Redding. The telephone interruption does not establish an attack on county government.

    The court serves Shasta County. Its unavailable hosted phone, fax and text-reminder services affected access to court information, while cases continued. This does not establish that every court service or county agency was interrupted.

Sources

Superior Court of Los Angeles County Connectivity Issues: Update #2

The revised July 19 notice described unavailable call centers, impaired electronic filing and postponed proceedings. Urgent filers were directed to clerk’s offices in person.

Superior Court of Los Angeles County Experiences Ransomware Attack

The court confirmed a ransomware attack early July 19 and said it disabled network systems to limit harm. Its preliminary investigation had found no evidence of compromised court-user data.

Court Closed Tomorrow After Ransomware Attack; General Order 2024-GEN-009-00

The court announced that all 36 courthouses would close July 22 because court-data platforms, telephones and internal case-management systems were inaccessible.

Stanislaus County Superior Court Experiences Temporary Phone Service Interruption

Stanislaus Superior Court said telephone service was unavailable because its phone network was hosted by Los Angeles Superior Court. It directed users to email and online alternatives.

Court Launches Updated Information Center for Restoration of Services

The July 24 update reported restored jury-registration and telephone instructions, plus remote appearances for civil, juvenile, criminal and appellate matters.

Phone Lines Down in Multiple Courts Across California After Ransomware Attack

Associated Press reported telephone outages at courts in Shasta, Inyo, San Luis Obispo, Stanislaus and Colusa counties using Los Angeles-hosted servers. Shasta also lost fax and text reminders while cases continued.

Court's July 25 service-status update: attorney portal unavailable

The court’s attached service-status table showed its attorney portal still unavailable, while courthouse counters, jury reporting and scheduled proceedings were operating.

Superior Court of Los Angeles County Returns to Normal Operations Following Ransomware Attack

The court announced July 29 that all public-facing and internal network systems had been restored that morning, including remote appearances, document access, jury registration, traffic payments and electronic filing.

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