Registry insights
See where documented incidents concentrate, who they affect and how their characteristics change over time.
Incident activity
277 incidents dated in this period
Attribution and disclosure
Threat actors
Explore-
Interlock 15 5%
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Qilin 15 5%
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INC Ransom 12 4%
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ShinyHunters 6 2%
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NightSpire 4 1%
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Rhysida 4 1%
6 threat actors tied at 3 incidents; this tied group is not shown.
Geographic impact
State impact
Bubble area represents incident count; one incident may appear in multiple states.
Ranked by incident count; one incident may appear in multiple states.
All 53 affected states and territories are shown.
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Texas 27 10%
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California 22 8%
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Georgia 17 6%
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Michigan 16 6%
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Florida 15 5%
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Massachusetts 15 5%
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Minnesota 13 5%
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Pennsylvania 13 5%
Counties
Showing 5 of 69 counties with repeated impact. 5 counties tied at 4 incidents; this tied group is not shown. 266 additional counties each appeared in one incident.
Cities
Showing 2 of 44 cities with repeated impact. 8 cities tied at 3 incidents; this tied group is not shown. 488 additional cities each appeared in one incident.
State-by-sector matrix
Each incident is counted once per state-sector pair.
| State or territory | Government Services and Facilities | Healthcare and Public Health | Information Technology | Water and Wastewater Systems | Emergency Services | Commercial Facilities |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Texas | 16 | 4 | 3 | — | 1 | — |
| California | 9 | 4 | 4 | — | — | 1 |
| Georgia | 7 | 2 | 2 | 3 | — | — |
| Michigan | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | — | 1 |
| Florida | 6 | 2 | 2 | — | 2 | 1 |
| Massachusetts | 7 | 4 | 2 | — | 2 | — |
| Minnesota | 5 | 2 | 1 | 4 | — | 1 |
| Pennsylvania | 9 | 2 | — | — | — | — |
Organizations and infrastructure
Organizations with repeated impact
Explore-
Winona County 2 1%
297 additional organizations each appeared in one incident.
Organization types
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Public Education 54 19%
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K-12 school district / LEA 41 15%
3 organization types tied at 16 incidents; this tied group is not shown.
Critical infrastructure sectors
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Healthcare and Public Health 31 11%
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Information Technology 21 8%
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Emergency Services 15 5%
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Commercial Facilities 10 4%
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Financial Services 10 4%
Incident status
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Presumed Resolved 138 50%
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Resolved 102 37%
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Active 24 9%
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Presumed Active 13 5%
Mechanisms and impacts
Attack mechanisms
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Unknown cyber mechanism 129 47%
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Unauthorized access 78 28%
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Ransomware 61 22%
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Malware 14 5%
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Data extortion 10 4%
3 mechanisms tied at 4 incidents; this tied group is not shown.
Operational impacts
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Internal systems unavailable 147 53%
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Network outage 89 32%
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Partial service outage 80 29%
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Manual workaround required 67 24%
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Phone service disruption 58 21%
Data impacts
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Unknown data impact 119 43%
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Data unavailable 78 28%
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Data theft or exfiltration 41 15%
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Unauthorized data access 37 13%
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No known data impact 19 7%
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Data encryption 18 6%
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Data publication or leak 10 4%
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Data exposure 6 2%
Extortion indicators
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No known extortion indicator 80 29%
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Leak-site listing 76 27%
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Unknown extortion indicators 73 26%
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Public leak threat 30 11%
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Ransom demand 30 11%
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Data-theft extortion 28 10%
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Direct victim contact 15 5%
Assessment and transparency
Cyber assessment
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Confirmed 267 96%
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Suspected 8 3%
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Unresolved 2 1%
Ransomware confidence
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Unresolved 118 43%
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Confirmed 45 16%
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Low 40 14%
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Not Ransomware 31 11%
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Medium 22 8%
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High 16 6%
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Suspected 1 0%
Cyber transparency
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Official cyber 220 79%
The organization publicly identifies the event as cyber-related.
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External cyber only 24 9%
Only external sources publicly identify the event as cyber-related.
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External sources identified the event as cyber-related before the organization publicly confirmed it.
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The disruption is documented, but available public information does not yet establish cyber involvement.
Disruption transparency
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Official disruption 246 89%
The organization publicly documents the resulting service disruption.
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External disruption only 23 8%
Credible external sources document the disruption, but the organization does not clearly do so.
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No disruption cues 8 3%
No credible public source clearly documents service disruption.
How these figures are calculated
Figures describe published registry coverage, not the prevalence of cyber incidents overall. Incidents are grouped by their canonical incident date rather than publication date.
An incident is counted once within each category. Geographic totals use explicitly impacted incident locations and do not treat an organization headquarters as an impacted place. Municipal impacts roll up to their recorded county and state, with each incident counted once per place. Affected organization counts use primary, victim, operator and owner relationships. Critical infrastructure and organization taxonomies remain separate.
Threat actor figures include only actors attached through eligible public claims. Same-date disclosure compares the calendar date of the first public signal with the calendar date of the official cyber disclosure; it does not measure elapsed hours or response speed. Mean days to later disclosure is the arithmetic mean only among valid intervals greater than zero, so longer intervals have more influence. Missing, invalid or reverse-ordered date pairs are excluded. Empty or unknown values are not inferred.